Interview: Robert Fogel by Aaron Steelman
RF: I understand that your initial academic interests
were in the physical sciences. How did you become
interested in economics, especially economic history?
Fogel: I became interested in the physical sciences while
attending Stuyvesant High School, which was exceptional in
that area. I learned a lot of physics, a lot of chemistry. I had
excellent courses in calculus. So that opened the world of 
science to me. I was most interested in physical chemistry and
thought I would major in that in college, but my father said
that it wasn’t very practical and persuaded me to go into 
electrical engineering. I found a lot of those classes boring
because they covered material I already had in high school, 
so it wasn’t very interesting and my attention started to drift
elsewhere. In 1945 and 1946, there was a lot of talk about
whether we were re-entering the Great Depression and the
widely held view was that we could not have full employment
in a capitalist society. So those debates started to shift my
interests to the social sciences and economics in particular.
RF: The 20th century has been a period of remarkable
progress. Yet, as you have written, in the era immediately
following World War II, many economists did not
expect the American economy to do as well as it has.
Similarly, economists generally believed that the future
for many developing countries was going to be signifi-
cantly bleaker than it turned out — that population
growth was going to be a major problem and that it was
quite unlikely that we would see such rapid progress
among the “Asian Tigers,” for instance. What do you
think accounts for those overly pessimistic forecasts?
Fogel: A lot of it was the difficulty of escaping from the
impact of the Great Depression and the influence of
Keynesianism, one reading of which seemed to suggest that
whatever had propelled capitalist economies during the 
19th century and early part of the 20th century — major
technical advances, the settlement of the frontier — had run
out of steam. This view was common at Harvard, Princeton,
and most of the other Ivy League schools. But it was hotly
contested by people such as Arthur Burns and Wesley
Mitchell who were centered around the National Bureau of
Economic Research and Columbia. So it never firmly took
hold there or at Chicago. 
But, in general, the profession had become pretty 
pessimistic about the future and feared that depressions
would occur with some frequency. Simon Kuznets, for
instance, was the least ideological economist I have ever
known, but even he was very cautious about the economy’s
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In the early 1960s, few economic historians engaged 
in rigorous quantitative work. Robert Fogel and the
“Cliometric Revolution” he led changed that. Fogel
began to use large and often unique datasets to test
some long-held conclusions — work that produced
some surprising and controversial results. For
instance, it was long believed that the railroads had
fundamentally changed the American economy. 
Fogel asked what the economy would have looked 
like in their absence and argued that, while important,
the effect of rail service had been greatly overstated. 
Fogel then turned to one of the biggest issues in all 
of American history — antebellum slavery. In 1974, 
he and Stanley Engerman published Time on the Cross.
They argued that on the eve of the Civil War, slavery
was far from a dying institution. Compared to
Northern agriculture, slave-based agriculture was 
relatively efficient. Moreover, slave labor was being 
put to productive uses in the manufacturing sector.
Fogel and Engerman were certainly not justifying the
South’s “peculiar institution” — they were simply 
trying to understand and explain how that system
functioned economically. Nevertheless, the book 
drew considerable criticism. Many of its conclusions,
however, have stood the test of time and it has 
become a classic work in economic history. More
recently, Fogel has turned to questions of economic
demography, including why life spans have increased 
so significantly in the developed world.
Fogel started his teaching career at Johns Hopkins
University, where he received his Ph.D. in 1963. He
subsequently taught at the University of Rochester, 
the University of Chicago, and Harvard University,
before returning to the Chicago faculty in 1981. Fogel
was awarded the Nobel Prize along with another 
economic historian, Douglass North, in 1993. Aaron
Steelman interviewed Fogel at his office in Chicago 
on November 13, 2006.
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we had entered a new era of economic growth and maybe the
Great Depression was the exception, not the norm.
When I was beginning my graduate work at Columbia in
1956-1957, James Angell, who taught the monetary course
and the basic macro graduate course, said that you still
couldn’t rule out the possibility that the economy was being
kept afloat by wars. First, you had World War II and then
you had the Korean War. So that
uncertainty was still prevalent
in the mid- to late-1950s, but 
I think it was beginning to shift
as we started to see more tech-
nological change and export-led
growth.
RF: How has the practice 
of  doing economic history
changed over the course of
your career? For instance, how
have improvements in the
processing of huge datasets
affected the research pro-
grams of economic historians?
Fogel: Prior to the mid-1950s,
there were no high-speed com-
puters and even the best in
those days were not as good as
my current laptop. When they said “create a loop,” they were
not talking metaphorically. They gave you a peg board 
and you literally wired a loop. 
If you were interested in doing empirical research, 
especially from micro data, the work was incredibly time-
intensive. First, data retrieval was very hard. We used to have
to go into archives with paper and pencil and record 
information by hand. Second, once you had assembled the
data, it took a long time to write and run the computer 
programs and to input the data by punch cards. So, as the
technology improved, you no longer needed to place such 
a high burden on theory. You could take several competing
theories, test them relatively quickly, and find out which one
was the most promising. Over time, this led us to increase
our ambitions. In the work I did on the aging of the Union
Army recruits, we could do careful longitudinal studies with
a lot of medical information from the military wartime
records and, for those who survived the war, from the 
pension records. That would have been impossible just a
couple of decades before.
RF: You were one of the pioneers in using rigorous 
quantitative methods to examine questions in economic
history. How was this approach received initially?
Fogel: Our teachers were very encouraging. They felt that
what we were doing was new and important. Often, they did
not have the same focus, but they thought that our 
techniques were appropriate. And those, like Kuznets, who
were very empirically oriented, were, of course, supportive
of the work. We did run into problems with some of the
younger people, though. I remember going to one meeting
of the British Economic History Society. Some young 
economic historians there said, “If you succeed, we will 
be unemployed.” So they felt we were a threat, but they 
were wrong because the “old-
fashioned” analytical history is
always relevant. We did not
want to replace that. We were
providing an additional dimen-
sion. Happily, I think that 
strife has largely ended. The
people who were at war with
quantifiers will now say, “If
quantification will help, by all
means, count.” They no longer
think we are barbarians. 
To do economic history well,
you need to understand the
social context in which people
were acting, and a lot of that is
qualitative, not quantitative.
You have to understand from
where the data have come —
and whether the data are real.
That’s old-fashioned history. 
I will give you an example. Bill Parker, who was an eco-
nomic historian at Yale and one of the earlier cliometricians,
was interested in the annual growth of cotton farming in the
19th century. He found a pamphlet produced by the
Department of Agriculture that gave data for cotton 
production by county between census years. So he went to
see the head of the department’s statistical division, showed
him the pamphlet, and asked if he had the raw data that 
were used to put it together. The fellow said he did not have
the data but the man who wrote the pamphlet was still alive,
occasionally came into the office, and the next time he did
he would call Bill, who was working in Washington that year.
So Bill eventually spoke to him and asked him how he 
collected the data. He said: “Well, I had the 1870 and 1880
census data. I had a big map of all the counties with infor-
mation on elevation and other soil properties. I looked at
the map and I looked at the census and I put those balloons
where I thought they ought to be.” 
So that happens. Some of the data are manufactured. 
Just because something is in print doesn’t mean it can be
trusted. You have to go back and find out how those data
were generated. 
Also, there are all kinds of mistakes that are made in the
census. When we go back to the original manuscripts, we
find errors, with a column being shifted over a slot, or simple
arithmetical problems, which means the numbers are not
internally consistent. Those data might be useful for setting





























RF Winter 07v43-sig3-INT  2/28/07  11:13 AM  Page 45upper or lower bounds. Or, in certain cases, the effect of a
bad number on your overall result will be so small that you
can use it. But you have to be very careful. 
RF: It seems that the United States has reached a point
in its development that would have been remarkable to
people just 50 years ago. For instance, food is so plenti-
ful and cheap that we seem to be
more concerned about obesity
than malnutrition among those
in the lower part of the income
distribution. How large, in your
opinion, are the changes that we
see in the way people live today
and what significance does that
have for the way we should look
at the process of economic
growth? 
Fogel: First of all, we are much
richer than we used to be. What we currently call the pover-
ty line is so high that only the top 6 percent or 7 percent of
the people who were alive in 1900 would be above it. That, by
the way, is also true when you compare us to other developed
countries.
England is a rich country but we are 50 percent richer,
and we do things that seem wasteful to the English. 
My wife came down with pneumonia in 2001 in London. 
She was treated at one of the city’s top hospitals, Guy’s and 
St. Thomas’ Hospital, which is directly across from
Parliament. Everything there was in wards, whereas in the
United States rooms are typically private or semi-private.
Americans today are used to having a phone beside their 
bed and 40 channels of television to watch while they are
recuperating from an illness. That is unusual, even in other
rich countries. Also, the way the diagnosis of her ailment was
conducted was different from the typical procedure used in
the United States. The doctors and nurses were very good
but they never X-rayed her. They just listened to her lungs
and came to the conclusion that she had pneumonia. If she
had been in the United States, the doctors typically would
have X-rayed her as a precautionary measure. So we make all
sorts of investments that the British are not willing to make.
They spend $1,193 per person per year on health care, while
we spend $3,724. 
We can do that because food, clothing, and shelter, 
which used to be 80 percent of a family’s expenditures, 
now account for only 35 percent. And a large part of the 
food expenditures actually go toward services rather than 
on consuming nutrients — for instance, when you eat at a
restaurant or when you buy food at a supermarket that is
highly processed. So we have become much richer over time
and also compared to the rest of the world.
I think there is a synergy between technological improve-
ments and physiological improvements. As you suggested 
in the question, we are not the same people that we were in
the past. The life expectancy 350 years ago was about 
30 years at birth while it’s about 78 years now in the United
States and England. We’re taller than we were by about 
10 inches and the median weight is about 50 percent greater.
Our immune systems function much better and our
endocrine systems work better. Also, if you have a health
problem, we have interventions that are very effective. So,
the advances in public health and
in medical technology have
allowed us to improve the quality
of life. Of course, health care is
more expensive too. But that’s a
trade-off that a rich country can
afford to make.
RF: Per-capita income grew very
rapidly during the 19th century,
yet life expectancy did not seem
to be greatly affected until the
20th century. How would you
explain that? Is it simply, or at least mostly, a matter of
significant innovations, especially in the pharmaceutical
and medical industries, during the 20th century?
Fogel: Part of it is that technological advances tend to build
on each other. For instance, we did not get really good con-
trol over the techniques for purifying drinking water until
about World War I, but we needed everything that was done
up to that point to figure out how to do it. Then there was a
diffusion process. Some cities implemented systems quickly
but others didn’t because it was very costly. There is a very
interesting article by David Cutler and Grant Miller looking
at the arguments in different cities for and against spending
money on water-purification projects. It often took cities
many years to finally go ahead and fund those projects.
We have looked at the relative importance of such large-
scale public health programs and it appears that they did a
great deal to expand life expectancy. Then there are issues
regarding the preparation and distribution of food products.
In 1900, about a third of cows in the United States had
bovine tuberculosis. Even when dairies started to pasteurize
the milk, it wasn’t very effective. There were a lot of con-
taminants that made it into the milk. So we probably didn’t
get a safe milk supply until the 1930s. Poultry is another
example. Kids now think that chicken is something that is
manufactured in some plant. They don’t realize that it was
once a living animal. When I went shopping with my moth-
er and you wanted a chicken, the butcher would go in the
back room and bring out a live chicken. My mother would
feel its breast and say, “No, I don’t want that one. Bring me
another one.” When she would finally choose one, the
butcher would break its neck, chop its head off, and bring 
it back to us plucked and singed. That process introduced
possibilities for contamination. Now, the purity of the food
supply is very good — so good that when a problem slips
through, it makes national headlines.
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innovations have been the poor. Those at the top of the
income distribution were always eating the best food avail-
able. They also were living in houses that were separated
from the rest so they didn’t have to worry about their 
wells being contaminated by seepage from the neighboring
buildings. So the major beneficiaries of these public-works
projects and technological changes have been the poor, who
now have access to safe food and water, which is relatively
cheap. But the wealthy also have benefited since the odds 
of cross-contamination are now low. 
RF: Could you please describe what you mean when you
use the term the “Fourth Great Awakening”? And how
does this concept differ from, say, Ronald Inglehart’s
idea of “post-materialism”?
Fogel: Inglehart is one of many writers who have dealt with
post-consumerism. The basic idea is that once a society
reaches a certain level of material
wealth, people really take many
material things for granted and
begin to search for other things —
nonmaterial things — to enrich their
lives. The example I like the most is
that in 1870, the head of the house-
hold used to have to work about
2,000 hours to provide the annual
food supply for the family. Now, that
person has to work only about 
240 hours. And with the price of
food still declining, that figure will
soon be closer to 160 hours. 
Here is another example: We now
take electricity for granted, but to
make electricity widely available,
you have to build up a huge physical
structure that produces and distrib-
utes it. I’m old enough to remember
when not all parts of New York had
electricity. They had metered gas 
as the form of lighting. You would
put a quarter into the meter and 
get 24 hours of gas or something 
like that. In fact, when I was an 
undergraduate, I read that about
two-thirds of the houses in the 1930s
did not have electricity. I didn’t real-
ize how new electricity was, and we
did not finish providing electricity
to the rural areas until the 1960s. 
Well, my kids don’t remember 
a time when you did not have 
televisions. In fact, TV sets were so
cheap when they were growing up
that you could afford to have one for
each person rather than having to fight over who was getting
to watch their favorite program on the lone set. What is
available to the mass public is so much greater than what was
available not so long ago. Going to the opera used to be 
considered an elite activity. What is new is that even a 
person with modest income can rent a DVD of an opera. 
So people’s discretionary time has increased dramatically
and they are able to pursue interests that they could have
only dreamed of in the past. That, I think, marks a whole
new age for many Americans. 
RF: Culture was a subject that interested many of the
classical economists but fell out of favor for a while and
now has experienced somewhat of a rebirth. In your
opinion, how important of a role does culture play in a
country’s economic development? And from a purely
methodological standpoint, how do you measure that?
Fogel: It’s true that the impact of culture is difficult to
measure. But if you assembled a
group of economic historians and
development economists in a room,
I think there would be nearly unani-
mous agreement that there are some
cultures that are pro-growth and
some that are anti-growth. I’m writ-
ing an article for Daedalus in which 
I forecast global growth rates, with 
a special emphasis on the European
Union (the original 15 members), the
United States, China, India, and
about half a dozen Southeast Asian
countries. In it, I argue that China’s
per-capita income will grow about 
8 percent per year until about 2040,
while India’s will grow about 6 per-
cent, even though India’s growth
rate is currently higher than that. 
The reasons I give are largely 
cultural. There are too many people
in India — some call them “rural
romantics” — who would be willing
to pay a price of two or three points
in the growth rate in order to pre-
serve certain traditional values. Also,
there are more ethnic minorities in
India than there are in China. Over
90 percent of China’s population is
Han Chinese and although the 
central government worries about
the Western provinces, which are
mostly Muslim, that problem is
more economic than political. In
fact, China is subsidizing those
provinces in order to reduce the gap
between them and the coastal areas.
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them to be quite as focused as China in pursuing high-
growth policies. 
This is analogous in a sense to the European countries:
They are willing to make similar sacrifices in their growth
rates in order to preserve what they see as important 
cultural values, such as equality. There are similar forces at
work in the United States. For instance, I believe that the
Green Party, if it ever achieved much political success, might
sacrifice economic growth in order to achieve other ends. 
It is possible for rich countries to achieve both — to get
rapid economic growth while enacting reforms to 
ameliorate the social problems they see as so important.
RF: You have made contributions to a very large number
of topics in economic history, but it seems clear that
your work on slavery in the antebellum United States —
especially Time on the Cross — has garnered the most
attention. How did you become interested in the topic
and how, if at all, have your views changed since that
book was published?
Fogel: First of all, we did not initially believe what we were
finding. The debate over the economics of slavery was an old
one. It went well back into the 19th century. But the view
that dominated was the Republican view of slavery, which
was a political view, not an economic one. It included 
the proposition that slavery was so
bad economically that it even made
the slave owners worse off. That
view appears in the work of
Frederick Law Olmsted, when he
said that a slave owner with 
50 slaves was poorer than the aver-
age policeman in New York City.
When you think of each slave as
having the value of a Rolls-Royce in
today’s dollars, imagine how far off
Olmsted’s argument seems to be. 
It was only ideology that could 
produce this type of argument. 
The abolitionists, especially the fundamentalists, knew
that slavery was wrong, that it was a sin. So that’s all there
was to it — there was no discussion beyond how to get rid 
of it. William Lloyd Garrison believed in immediate 
emancipation gradually carried out. Salmon Chase — who
was the governor of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury, and
later a Supreme Court justice — was the most brilliant abo-
litionist politician. Chase’s reaction to Garrison was that
Garrison wanted to wear sackcloth and eat burnt ashes,
while Chase wanted to build coalitions broad enough to
bring the system down, even though that involved compro-
mising some principles. So the abolitionists were similar to
the Religious Right. They believed they were in direct 
contact with God. Many of the famous abolitionists at one
point or another walked into the woods and had a spiritual
encounter. They were not people who could be said to be 
big believers in the Chicago School of economics.
So when the cliometricans started out, it was widely
believed that a system as evil as slavery could not be 
economically efficient. But there had been some economists
who had measured the profitability of slavery and found that
it was a profitable enterprise. Slave owners made at least the
market rate of return. But few doubted that it was less 
efficient than free labor in the North; there really wasn’t
another side to the argument. When we first performed a
back of the envelope calculation, it turned out that slave
farms were 6 percent more efficient than free farms. 
Stan Engerman and I found that result silly so we 
decided to do a more careful study. We thought that we
would then find that slavery was something like 90 percent
as efficient as Northern labor. That was a smaller gap than
we originally thought it would be, but it still was the less 
efficient of the two systems. However, the more refined 
calculations produced a different result. It showed that 
slave agriculture was 36 percent more efficient than free
agriculture. So we had a problem at that point — our results
did not conform to what we had predicted or what theory
might suggest — so we did what economists do when faced
with such a dilemma: We applied to the National Science
Foundation and got a grant to study the issue in more depth.
W. W. Norton put out a new edition of Time on the Cross
in 1989, in which Stan and I wrote an epilogue. The long and
short of it was that we were all
sucked in by the political argument.
But when you started looking at the
numbers, the Republican account
just did not hold up. So it was very
shocking. We got into deep argu-
ments with friends. My wife and 
I were close friends with Peter
Temin and his wife, but the slavery
debate led to some discord between
Peter and me. So our wives brought
us together and said, “You can argue
as much as you want in your offices,
but once you cross the threshold of
either house, forget it.” I think, on the whole, we managed
not to undermine personal relationships, even though the
sometimes-bitter debate that followed the book’s publica-
tion could have done that. Also, I felt very uncomfortable
thinking of slaves as a commodity. It was very hard to talk
about it in class. I always felt a sense of embarrassment and
felt the need to make it clear that I was not in favor of 
slavery. The fact that slavery was efficient did not mean that
it was good. 
RF: I notice that you are close to publishing a collection
of interviews with economists. Whom did you speak
with for that book and what insights do you expect will
emerge about the changing nature of economics during
the 20th century?
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Fogel: My wife and I are writing a small book called Simon
Kuznets and the Empirical Tradition in Economics. For the book,
we did many interviews. Some of the people we talked with
knew Simon well personally, while some of them had little
connection to him but were intellectual leaders in economics.
We are using some of this material in the book, but there
was also a lot of interesting material that simply did not fit.
So we decided that we would collect these interviews and
publish them separately in a book that is tentatively titled
The Transformation of Economics, 1914-1980: Interviews with
Economists. For instance, we have about eight hours of inter-
views with Milton and Rose Friedman. Milton had worked
closely with Simon, co-authoring an important book titled
Income from Independent Professional Practice, part of which
also served as Milton’s dissertation. The interviews with the
Friedmans are wide-ranging and provide a superb history of
the economy and of the discipline. There is some overlap
with the material in their autobiography, Two Lucky People,
but most of the discussions break new ground.
RF: There’s a large gap in your academic CVfrom 1948,
when you finished your undergraduate degree, to the
mid-1950s, when you enrolled in graduate school. What
were you doing during that period?
Fogel:When I graduated from college, I had two job offers.
One was from my father, to join him in the meat-packing
business. That would have been quite lucrative. The other
was as an activist for a left-wing youth organization. I chose
the latter and worked as an activist from 1948 to 1956. At the
time I was making that decision, my father told me: “If you
really believe in that cause, come work with me. You will
make a much higher wage and you could give your extra
income to hire several people instead of just yourself.” 
I thought, well, that makes some sense. But I was convinced
that this was a way to get me to change my views or at least
lessen my commitment to an ideological cause that I found
very important. Yes, the first year, I might give all of 
my extra money to the movement, but every year I would
probably give less, and finally reach the point when I was 
giving nothing at all. I feared I would be co-opted. I thought
this was my father’s way of indoctrinating me. 
So I went to work as an activist. At first, I thought what 
I was doing was important. But over time, I started to
become disillusioned. The Marxists had predicted a depres-
sion in 1947-1948. That didn’t happen, so they said, it will
happen the next year. But it never came. So by the early
1950s, I began seriously reconsidering my position. I had
been drawn to Marxism because I thought of it as a science.
But it was pretty clear that its “scientific” predictions were
wildly off the mark. I was ready to leave the movement, but
then McCarthyism started to heat up and that led me to 
hesitate. I stayed a few more years to fight against
McCarthyism. But by 1955 and 1956, the horrors that had
occurred under Stalin, which we had all heard about but didn’t
really believe, were confirmed by Khrushchev. That was the
breaking point in a sense. I began to rethink my views and
especially my involvement with Marxism. So I decided that
I needed to receive more serious training in economics and
the social sciences generally and went to Columbia.
RF: Did the failures of Marxism to accurately analyze the
economic situation in the United States influence you to
pursue work that was heavily data driven and empirical? 
Fogel:There is no doubt about that. As I said, Marxism was
sold as a science, but it became clear that it was not. It was
more of an ideology than anything else. My early experiences
made me very skeptical of ideologues of any persuasion. I’m
willing to be surprised, to accept seemingly radical ideas, but
there better be data to back up those claims, and Marxism
could not provide that type of evidence.
RF: Which economists have influenced you the most?
Fogel:Well, obviously Simon Kuznets would be at the top of
the list. The older I get, the more I realize the extent to
which my whole outlook on economics was shaped by him.
George Stigler had a big influence on me, first as a student at
Columbia and then as a colleague at Chicago. I took his
price theory course at Columbia. He was an extremely smart
man, a great teacher, and had a great wit. I never got heavily
involved in monetary economics, but I was certainly 
influenced by Milton’s empiricism. Robert Solow also had a
huge influence on me. He provided a framework for looking
at growth that was extremely useful in my work. Tom
Schelling was another strong influence on me. You couldn’t
be at Harvard without being impressed by him. He has one
of the most probing, original minds I have ever encountered. 
I would say, though, that the biggest influence on me 
has been my graduate students, many of whom I have 
collaborated with very closely. The story I am about to tell is
already in print, but it’s worth recounting. It’s about a casual
lunch that several of us had at the Quadrangle Club. Harry
Johnson, Al Harberger, Zvi Griliches, and I were there.
During the conversation, Mike Mussa’s name came up, and
we each said that Mike knew as much about our field as 
we did. He had processed all this information and theory
that he had taken from his classes and synthesized it in a
remarkable fashion. But none of us was willing to say that we
each knew as much as all four people at that lunch. 
On the slavery issue, Claudia Goldin did some really
insightful work as a graduate student. Dora Costa’s disserta-
tion, which in book form won the Paul A. Samuelson Award,
has had a major influence on the study of changes in the
process of aging over the course of the 20th century.
Some people are able to carry out their work on their
own, but not the type of research I have done or am doing
currently. One person can master only so many skills, and for
my work you really need to have collaboration with others. 
I have been very fortunate to have had such a great group of
colleagues and students. RF
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